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Abstract: This paper analyses the construction of risk and its effects on three groups of highly 
skilled professionals doing project work (video game designers, freelance journalists and 
performing artists). Our results reveal that high qualifications are not a universal protective factor 
in the risk society. They suggest, rather, that the political economy of the various markets in 
which knowledge workers offer their services, as well as the institutions that structure these 
markets—or do not—is at least as important in determining the fate that awaits them when they 
are old or sick, and that these other factors help create, among these highly skilled workers, a 
variety of risk societies. 
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In his foresighted book, Ulrich Beck (1992) speaks of the ‘destandardization of work,’ 
and more specifically of the creation of a risk-fraught system of flexible, pluralized 
underemployment, in which both risk and the responsibility for protecting against it are being 
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shifted to workers. A similar logic operates in many sectors of the economy, in which atypical 
forms of work are multiplying. To understand contemporary transformations of work, the 
concepts of risk and insecurity are more relevant for analysing workers’ experiences than the 
concept of flexibility, which reflects changes from the employers’ point of view (Allen and 
Henry 1997). 
Critics decry the homogeneous view of the risk society, pointing out that social class and 
gender have an influence, especially on the nature and degree of risk and on workers’ resources 
to protect themselves. ‘Risk divides,’ creating winners and losers (Allen and Henry 1997) or, in 
other words, ‘Individuals live in different types of risk societies’ (Cooper 2008).  
As a contribution to the effort to understand the variety of risk societies, we will 
concentrate here on so-called winners: knowledge workers, highly skilled professionals who 
work on projects that bring together short-lived teams rather than provide their services as part of 
a continuous-flow model. This new form of production makes it easier to shift the risk to 
workers and gives rise to new risks, such as the rapid obsolescence of knowledge (loss of 
employability) and exclusion from useful job-placement networks, which coexist with traditional 
social risks (illness, injury, motherhood, age). 
We have not, as is too easily done, taken it for granted that highly skilled workers are 
automatically winners, but rather hypothesize that there are a variety of different risk situations 
within the knowledge economy. Based on a comparative study of three groups of knowledge 
workers (video game designers, freelance journalists and performing artists) in Quebec, we 
examine the relative share of the risk of losing income that falls to workers and employers/clients 
and the effects or this distribution in terms of workers’ insecurity, as well as the resources they 
have available to deal with risk.  
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The first three sections of this paper set out the problem, the theoretical framework and 
the method. The fourth describes the distribution of risk and its effects on the workers concerned 
in the three occupations studied, while the fifth focuses on the kinds of resources (public, 
commercial, family and professional) they have available to deal with the risks of 
underemployment, illness or injury, parenthood, aging and the obsolescence of knowledge. The 
last section provides a comparative analysis of these three risk societies, in terms of power 
relations and institutions. We conclude that in the knowledge economy, tradable skills or a high 
level of cultural and social capital are a necessary but insufficient asset, mediated by power 
relations and institutions that affect the degree of risk as well as the level and type of protective 
resources. 
1. Background  
Employment risk results from the interaction of two phenomena. First, new forms of 
organization of production, work and employment, which make workers bear the entire brunt of 
ups and downs and uncertainty. Second, the weakening of protective institutions, whether 
minimum employment standards, the right to collective bargaining or protection through pooled 
social insurance programs. As a result of these two phenomena, individual workers are 
increasingly obliged to behave like contractors who make choices and must live with the 
consequences. The proponents of the risk society emphasize the emergence of the thoughtful, 
rational, informed and aware individual, able to react to such changes (Quilgars and Abbott 
2000). 
Although they appreciate Beck’s (1986) and Giddens’s (1991) groundbreaking work, 
many authors criticize their overly uniform understanding of the concept of risk as applied to the 
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world of work, pointing out that it ignores the structural effects of social class and gender: ‘The 
experience of employment risk is likely to be highly differential between and among different 
social class groupings and between men and women’ (Reimer 1998, 117). Others (Castel 2003; 
Cooper 2008; Quilgars and Abbott 2000) have drawn attention to inequalities in the distribution 
of risk and economic, cultural and social capital that can provide protection against risk. In short, 
we live in several risk societies (Cooper 2008), with variable degrees of risk and kinds of capital 
and resources required to protect ourselves.  
Qualification level is often cited as one of the main structural factors of inequalities 
between winners and losers. Skilled workers, who have tradable skills, are considered to be 
among the winners (Ekinsmyth 1999; Reimer 1998). A high skill level supposedly confers 
considerable market bargaining power, guaranteeing high pay and ability to afford individual 
protection against illness and preparation for retirement; furthermore, it is supposedly associated 
with the human and social capital needed to navigate through this society. This is how the 
privatization of risk heightens the differences between those with capital and those without 
(Cooper 2008).  
Yet researchers who have studied atypical professionals are often pessimistic, especially 
in liberal nations like the United States; their work reveals that although highly skilled workers 
are generally quite well paid, they have virtually no social protection (Barley and Kunda 2004; 
Benner 2002; Kalleberg  2003). While they are certainly more likely than non-professionals to be 
able to purchase protection on the market (D’Amours and Crespo 2004), a considerable number 
of new professionals lack such protection. In this respect, they are not very different from 
atypical non-professional workers and rely wholly on their ability to work to handle risk. When 
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their ability to work is affected, by illness, for example, professionals, too, find themselves in a 
very precarious position (D’Amours 2009). 
Some studies suggest that the individual market power of highly skilled workers depends 
not just on their relative power with respect to purchasers of labour, but also on national job 
market and social protection regulations, which give self-employed workers, for example, a more 
ou less important degree of protection against economic and social risks (McManus 2000; 
Meager 1994). Taking up Devine et al.’s (2000, 521) general argument that ‘the privilege and 
power of professions can only be understood in the context of the organizations in which they are 
employed and the political economy in which those organizations operate,’ in this paper we 
attempt to assess the effect of power relations and institutions on the type of risk experienced by 
workers with considerable intellectual capital and on their ability to protect themselves against 
risk.  
2. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework combines two models: that of Morin (1999) to study how risk 
is shared between employers (or clients, in the case of the self-employed) and workers, as well as 
to understand the nature and degree of risk in each occupation, and that of welfare mix (Evers, 
Pijl, and Ungerson 1994) to analyse the types of resources workers have available to protect 
themselves. 
In the postwar Fordist era (1950–80), the job markets in industrialized countries were 
regulated by a protective institutional structure. A company purchasing labour assumed most of 
the economic risk, and the social risks (illness, injury, retirement) were pooled, while workers 
covered by collective bargaining obtained additional protection in the form of insurance plans, 
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maternity leave and retirement plans to which employers contributed. The share of risk assumed 
solely by workers was limited by the establishment of permanent, full-time employment with a 
single employer and by institutions: major legislative protection in continental Europe, collective 
bargaining on North American internal labor markets, and a social safety net of varying 
generosity, depending on the country, funded by income taxes and/or contributions by employers 
and workers.  
Against the backdrop of globalization and increased competition, in the past 30 years we 
have seen production reorganized in a variety of ways—development of corporate networks, 
subsidiarization or outsourcing in which the principal firm maintains control over the final 
product, while at the same time passing down the chain various types of risks of loss of revenue 
(Morin 2005), especially the risk of occupational injury (Quinlan et al. 2001) and last, the 
multiplication of non-standard or atypical forms of employment (Dupuy and Larré 1998; Morin 
1999), which shift an increasing share of economic uncertainty and social risk onto workers.  
To study our three groups, we use a slightly adapted version of the model developed by 
Dupuy and Larré (1998), then Morin (1999), to study the risks associated with various forms of 
work organization:  
– Inherent business risk – Who takes the risk of allocating resources to develop a product 
without knowing if it will sell?  
– Performance risk – Is compensation tied to time spent working or to results? 
– Employment risk – Is the employment relationship lasting or limited to the duration of the 
performance, exposing the worker to the recurrent risk of being unemployed or 
underemployed? 
– Occupational safety risk  
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– Social risk associated with loss of income in case of illness, motherhood and ageing 
At the same time, as forms of production became increasingly diversified, the institutions 
that assumed collective risk and helped decommodify workers (Esping-Andersen 1999) began to 
weaken. On the one hand, there was a decline in internal labor markets, unionization and 
collective bargaining, with corresponding growth in atypical employment relationships. On the 
other, the welfare state, and more specifically, collective means of assuming social risks, began 
to crumble. Responsibility for preventing risk (Dean 1997; McCluskey 2002; O’Malley 2004; 
Quadagno 1999) or managing it by means of commercial, family or community resources was 
increasingly left up to the individual. The welfare state shrank, while the welfare mix (Evers, 
Pijl, and Ungerson 1994)—the various state, market, family and community resources available 
to help workers cope with risk—expanded. 
Our research question can be stated as follows: In three groups of knowledge workers 
who are organized into project teams—video game designers, freelance journalists and 
performing artists—how is risk shared along the value chain and on what resources can these 
workers rely for protection? 
3. Method 
We selected three groups of workers in the knowledge economy, which is characterized 
by ‘the preponderance of intangible assets, activities with high knowledge content and the use of 
a workforce extremely specialized in producing or providing one-of-a-kind or customized goods 
or services, the value of which is directly related to innovation’ (Chartrand-Beauregard and 
Gingras 2005, 2). What these groups have in common is a high level of education and coverage 
by the Quebec legislative and social protection system that falls within the liberal category in 
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Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. Generally speaking, only employees, not the 
self-employed, are protected by labour laws (including the right to unionize). The self-employed 
are not entitled to protection in case of unemployment, nor to the insurance, vacation or pension 
plans that employees may negotiate with their employers. Also, as in the United States but unlike 
Europe, labour markets for the self-employed are scarcely regulated. Professionals governed by 
licensing bodies and performing artists, who have a special collective labour relations scheme, 
are exceptions. But Canada’s and Quebec's regimes have some distinctive characteristics. For 
example, all Canadians are protected by universal health insurance and minimum old age 
security benefits, and all Quebec workers (employees and self-employed) are entitled to parental 
leave and contributory pension plans; yet the self-employed must pay twice the contribution to 
obtain the same amount of protection as an employee. Moreover, the unionization rate (36,3% of 
employees are unionized in 2011 and 39,6% are protected by the legal extension of limited 
provisions of another group’s collective agreement) is much higher in Quebec than elsewhere in 
North America and minimum employment standards play a more important role by the scope of 
the labour force they cover and the number of working conditions they embrace (wages, hours of 
work, annual leave, statutory holidays, family and parental leave, notice of termination, recourse 
against psychological harassment and dismissal not made for good and sufficient cause, etc.). 
These three groups of workers are distinguished by the features of their segment of the 
labour market and the institutions that govern them: employer-employee relationship or business 
relationship, collective bargaining or lack thereof.  
– In Quebec, most video game designers are employees. This status entitles them to the 
protection of minimum employment standards, and some employers offer income 
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replacement insurance, although these workers’ extreme mobility means they hardly ever 
benefit from it. They have the right to unionize, but none of them have done so.  
– Being self-employed, freelance journalists are not covered by labour laws or most social 
programs to which employees are entitled, and have no right to unionize under the Labour 
Code.  
– Performing artists, considered in Quebec to be self-employed, are not covered by labour laws 
including the right to unionize under the Labour Code, but have gained a special collective 
labour relations scheme, derived from the Labour Code, that allows them to negotiate 
industry-wide minimum working conditions, including client contributions to social 
protection.  
To document the situation of these three groups, we conducted semistructured interviews, 
with the addition, in the case of the journalists, of a survey questionnaire and exhaustive search 
of the literature.  
Between February 2006 and February 2007, Martine D’Amours conducted 60 
semistructured interviews on the risk-management strategies of self-employed workers: 10 with 
artists (musicians, authors, directors, actors, screenwriters), equal numbers of women and men, 
and 4 with freelance journalists, essentially in Greater Montreal. In 2008, she studied the 
regulation of the actors’ labour market, and in particular the 20-year-old collective labour 
relations scheme in the performing arts sector, by combining a review of the literature and 
interviews with about a dozen key informants: performing artists, agents and association 
representatives. The case of freelance journalists was first studied qualitatively in 2002, through 
documentary research and interviews with some 20 freelance journalists and clients, rounded off 
in 2007–2008 by a survey of 118 journalists in two professional associations. The sample of 118 
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freelancers had slightly more women (52.3%) than men and the mean age of respondents was 42. 
Most of the artists and journalists surveyed were university graduates. 
In summer 2008, Marie-Josée Legault interviewed 53 designers employed by large video 
game studios in Montreal, equal numbers of men and women; three quarters were under 35 years 
of age. Virtually all respondents had a postsecondary diploma or degree (close to half had an 
undergraduate degree or higher).  
4. Risk sharing in the knowledge economy 
Unlike in the Fordist era, contemporary project management has been increasingly 
transferring risk to workers, although the manner has differed by subsector.  
4.1 Video game designers 
Video game design studios produce original, one-of-a-kind products for a market 
constantly demanding something new. The financial risk incurred in the industry is high, given 
that a mere 5% of games make a profit (IGDA 2004, 22). Just 10% of games account for 90% of 
income. Competition is international and positions on the market are insecure and changeable. In 
addition to big studios worldwide, there are also swarms of small, amazingly creative 
independent designers. In Canada alone, there are 101 microstudios with up to 5 employees, and 
149 with between 6 and 50 employees (ESAC 2011, 9).  
The video game industry is multinational and dominated by a handful of big game 
publishers—industry giants—which have a strong aversion to risk. In Quebec, information 
technology is the R&D-driven industry that attracts the greatest share (46.2%) of venture capital, 
surpassing the health-care industry between 2008 and 2011 (Corbeil 2011, 25). Venture capital 
takes a shareholder approach, and any suggestion of taking a stakeholder approach is simply not 
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up for discussion. Publishers protect themselves against inherent business risk by taking 
advantage of international mobility and passing risk along the value chain, including exercising 
significant control over video game design studios.  
Like a book publisher, a game publisher acquires the intellectual property rights to games 
that it thinks are promising and pays for them based on a licensing system in which the designer 
(studio or freelance designer) is compensated chiefly by an advance against royalties, which 
depend on anticipated retail sales. So the studio assumes any losses. When a small independent 
studio works on a game project, it assumes 100% of the inherent business risk and the designers 
may not get any royalties or compensation if no publisher buys the game. Big studios are better 
protected by the revenue from successful projects, but they, in turn, pass on a good part of the 
inherent business risk to the designers, through the compensation system.  
In game design, the key risk factors are budget constraints, deadline and scope of order—
known in project management as the iron triangle. The scope of the order is by its nature 
constantly changing because what it is possible or impossible to do, at what cost and in what 
time, is unknown at first. Generally speaking, the key to a project’s failure lies in a combination 
of the three conditions of the iron triangle (IGDA 2004, 31; Standish 2009; Dosani 2001). 
Labour is by far the biggest budget item. Compensation is managed to optimize costs, 
that is, to make them predictable and tie them to product sales. To do so, compensation is split 
into a fixed part, with unlimited unpaid overtime (despite the fact that employees are covered by 
the Act respecting labour standards), and a variable part, in the form of bonuses paid if the game 
is successful (Legault and Ouellet 2012). Compensation is therefore tied much more to results 
than to time spent working. That means designers assume the performance risk by taking on part 
of the inherent business risk. They respect the constraints of the iron triangle all the more 
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because they have a direct interest in the success of every project. Not only is the variable part of 
their compensation tied to it, but their reputation depends on it, and that is their primary asset 
when seeking new work and negotiating their fixed pay, which each worker must do individually 
(Legault and Ouellet 2012).  
The project context increases the employment risk because every project demands 
competencies specific to the object to be designed; there is never any guarantee that team 
members will have a job once the project is over. It is easy to dismiss people if a conflict arises 
when there is no job security. Designers can’t spend too long looking for work because they are 
soon shunted aside in the industry if their knowledge is out of date or they have lost their 
network of contacts. The health hazards most often mentioned are related to the long working 
hours: burnout and musculoskeletal disorders in the arms and hands from intensive repetitive use 
of joints are very common in this field.  
4.2 Freelance magazine journalists 
While freelance journalism has always existed, it expanded considerably in the early 
1980s. Against a backdrop of heightened competition, accompanied by a new phase of media 
concentration, newspaper and magazine publishers diversified their platforms and content to 
cater to specialized audiences. Most content for these new media (news magazines, specialized 
periodicals, special inserts in dailies) is produced by an army of freelancers: journalists, 
photographers and illustrators, co-ordinated upstream (planning, orders) and downstream 
(editing, proofreading) by a small in-house team of employees.  
Of course, it is the publisher that takes the risk of launching a new magazine, without 
knowing whether it will be popular with readers or, especially, advertisers. But this inherent 
business risk is mitigated by the fact that the magazine publisher is usually part of a 
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conglomerate, within which financial risks are shared and content is recycled on various 
platforms (magazines, TV channels, Web sites, CD-ROMs).  
To facilitate the transfer of business risk, since 1980, publishers have tended to require 
freelance journalists to assign their copyright to them. Journalists must often assume the 
performance risk as well, because to interest a new magazine, they must come up with proposals 
for articles, not knowing whether they will lead to paid commissions. They are paid a flat fee per 
article, no matter how long it takes to produce one or more versions, because a mix of written 
rules (contracts) and informal practices protect the publisher and editor in chief against the risk 
of receiving an article of lower quality than desired. For example, an article written on spec is 
not commissioned and won’t be paid for unless it is accepted for publication. Even a 
commissioned article is only paid for if the magazine’s editorial team feels that it is what they 
asked for and it meets house requirements. When the editor in chief deems an article unsuitable 
for publication, he or she may decide to (but is not required to) offer the journalist a kill fee, 
which is a fraction (generally between a quarter and a third) of the fee initially agreed upon. The 
magazine keeps the article as submitted and all the rights to it.  
Increasing economic concentration, the technological capability to deliver the same 
content on a number of platforms and the growing trend to have non-journalist contributors have 
reduced the overall volume of original pieces commissioned from freelance journalists, 
exacerbating the employment risk. And, except in a small number of cases, magazines make no 
commitment to give journalists any more work. In total, 58.2% of the freelancers surveyed 
experience frequent or occasional dry spells. The fewer regular clients they have, the higher the 
risk. Also, being forced to assign their copyright to the publisher deprives them of income from 
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publication on another platform;
1
 the publisher henceforth owns any and all new value created in 
this way. 
Freelancers, like employees, risk their safety, especially when reporting from conflict 
zones, or during strikes or demonstrations. Furthermore, illness (even burnout) can be caused by 
overwork, sometimes induced by a fear that work, and therefore income, will dry up. Illness 
poses three special types of problems to freelancers: the cost of health care not covered by the 
universal plan, income replacement during periods without work and the risk involved in 
withdrawing from the networks in which their knowledge and reputation are maintained. 
4.3 Performing artists 
Performing artists work within a kind of project management system in which their self-
employment status is only the primary risk factor. Once again, the economic situation 
(concentration, increasing privatization of production, market segmentation) and technological 
developments (possibility of reproduction on several platforms, especially the World Wide Web) 
have had effects on the spreading of risk among the various links in the chain. On these job 
markets dominated by a small number of broadcasters, every project competes with a host of 
other projects. Experience, reputation and past success are no guarantees of future work, which 
depends largely on fashion and trends. 
Inherent business risk is assumed mainly by producers. They are the ones committing 
resources in the hopes that their products will be bought by a broadcaster. While some producers 
pay for this preproduction step themselves, there are also some public sources of funding. 
Generally speaking, from the funding-application stage, production of a recorded show must 
obtain one or more expressions of interest from a broadcaster (Avrich-Johnson 2002, 7) who, to 
reduce the risk, often imposes the choice of certain star performers. Labadie and Rouet (2007) 
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highlight the role and growing power of distributors and broadcasters in production decisions, 
because marketing is so crucial, and our respondents confirmed this.  
Like freelance journalists, authors, screenwriters and directors assume the inherent 
business risk, which consists in coming up with projects, not knowing whether they will make it 
to the production stage. Group agreements have helped reduce somewhat the risk of working 
without pay by stipulating the amount to be paid at each stage of writing. Like producers, these 
artists work on a range of projects at the same time, knowing that a good number of them will 
never be produced. 
Like video game designers, artists assume the performance risk because part of their 
compensation is related to the performance of the work (and covered by group agreements), 
while another part (copyright, residual rights) depends on the success of the work. Given the 
media concentration that has taken place, there is a growing trend to pay a flat fee (that includes 
residual rights and delivery on several platforms) (Labadie and Rouet 2007). To counter this 
practice, which makes their members poorer, artists’ associations are trying to negotiate a 
percentage of the revenue from delivery of the works on other platforms, especially digital, a 
major source of income for the industry. But this demand also has its risks; some people fear that 
it will lead to a reduction in performance fees. 
In this sector, characterized by short-term contracts, employment risk is assumed by the 
artists, since, as a general rule, there is no commitment to provide them with work beyond a 
single performance. As in the case of journalists, this is compounded by the risk of obsolescence 
of knowledge and of disappearing from their networks of contacts, which can jeopardize the rest 
of their careers. In contrast, the role of networks in spreading reputations can also increase risk 
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because any information about a personal situation (illness, motherhood) liable to reduce 
availability may actually harm their job prospects.  
The safety risk increases in some types of work that demand physical abilities, 
particularly for dancers, but for actors and musicians, as well. Social risk is partly pooled, 
through group agreements. We will come back to this in the next section.  
In closing, it should be pointed out that although it is useful to distinguish the various 
risks analytically, they are in fact interrelated, and this is true for all three occupational groups 
studied. For example, underemployment or the fear of it often leads professionals not to refuse 
any offer of work, thus increasing their risk of falling ill; yet many people feel they should avoid 
overwork and exhaustion because getting sick could significantly affect their volume of work 
and income. But conversely, reducing their workload to preserve their health, especially as they 
get older, can cause serious problems of underemployment and therefore income. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. Welfare mix in knowledge economy 
In our study of what Evers, Pijl and Ungerson (1994) term the welfare mix—the state, the 
market, the family and the community—we have limited the latter to the professional community 
which, through formal or informal bargaining with clients, can secure some kinds of protection.  
5.1 Video game designers 
As employees, video game designers benefit from public income support programs in 
case of unemployment. A small number are non-resident immigrants ineligible for employment 
insurance, who would have to go home if they lost their jobs.  
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A large proportion of respondents said that the universal Quebec parental insurance plan 
would be their main resource if they had a baby. But eligibility for the plan does not protect them 
against employment risk. Half of respondents felt that having a child would cause them major 
employability problems: having to cut back on their working hours, being marginalized or 
having their prospects for promotion jeopardized, being assigned to smaller projects.  
They are also eligible for some resources paid for in whole or in part by employers. For 
instance, keeping current in the field is an extremely important issue, and some employers pay 
for professional development activities: international conferences, specialized training, intensive 
on-the-job training. Yet decisions about paying for professional development are arbitrary and 
the way people are chosen is obscure to many designers. Designers employed by the bigger 
studios have a group registered retirement savings plan (RRSP) to which the employer 
contributes, but this is unusual in the industry. 
Seventy percent of major studio employees have income replacement insurance in case of 
illness or injury, with the level of protection chosen by the employee. Thirty percent of 
employees of small independent studios do not enjoy the same level of protection in case of 
illness or injury and would have to rely solely on government income protection plans, which 
means workers’ compensation in the case of occupational disease or injury and income security 
in other cases.  
Designers’ pay is about 150% of that of all graduates in the same age bracket (25–34) 
with the same level of education, but it varies individually. That explains why, in case of 
unemployment, over half said they would rely on their own financial resources: savings, selling 
off their investments, private insurance policies taken out with their mortgage or life insurance, 
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selling their houses or possessions, severance pay if they are not fired, income from a company 
they own, bank loans.  
The huge importance of individual strategies for obtaining a better position on the job 
market should be noted: respondents rely on their own performance, aim to ‘stay the best,’ 
update their knowledge, keep their portfolios right up to date and agree to work as much 
overtime as their leads want them to. A number of people were counting on their contacts to find 
another job in the industry or in a related field, most often filmmaking; others were counting on 
their professional or geographic mobility, having a variety of skills or being able to move at a 
moment’s notice. Many said they would turn to their families, spouses or friends for support 
between jobs or in case of illness.  
Questioned about how they prepare against the risk of total loss of employment income in 
case of illness or injury, they said they kept in shape, paid attention to their health, were cautious, 
didn’t go in for extreme sports, saw a psychologist, led a healthy lifestyle, had friends and so on. 
In a word, they counted on themselves more than anything.  
5.2 Freelance journalists 
Since they are self-employed, freelance journalists do not contribute to and are not 
protected by the public employment insurance plan. They can join the occupational health and 
safety compensation plan only if they pay the employer’s contributions and, as a result, they 
rarely do so. Since 2006, new parents, whether employees or self-employed, are entitled to 
Quebec parental insurance benefits.  
Not having an employer, freelancers are not eligible for disability insurance, sick leave, 
maternity leave or pension plans that publishers offer their employees. Unlike video game 
designers, who can count at least partly on their employers’ contributions, it is extremely rare for 
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a client to pay for a freelance journalist’s training. So freelancers (92.3% of respondents) must 
pay for any training themselves.  
Close to half of respondents are protected by their spouse’s supplementary health 
insurance, but most have no disability insurance to cover the loss of earnings in case of illness. 
Private insurance policies (even the cheaper group policies obtained through associations) are 
deemed too expensive for the anticipated benefits. In case of illness, it is usually personal 
savings or spouses that fill the breach. With no income-replacement protection, some people 
continue working even when sick. If they need surgery, they try to schedule it so that their 
convalescence takes place in a slack period. Many journalists, like game designers, say that they 
try to live a healthy lifestyle to avoid illness. 
Also, even when they are sick or new parents, freelancers must honour their 
commitments, or they’ll lose their clients. That may mean working with a newborn in their arms, 
as one new mother who kept up a few of her columns said, ‘because you can’t neglect your 
clients for too long,’ or passing on or subcontracting the most urgent jobs to colleagues, using 
informal mutual-aid systems.  
The freelance journalists surveyed try to protect themselves against underemployment by 
developing repeat contacts with the same clients (between two and nine, for most), from which 
they earn an average of close to 80% of their income. This protects them from dry spells, but the 
weakness of the strategy is that losing one major client can put a big dent in income. To try to 
offset the risk of lack of work, some branch out into related fields, or even completely unrelated 
jobs, to put food on the table. When they find themselves without work, others rely first and 
foremost on their spouse or family, with the risk of dependency that that implies. 
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5.3 Performing artists 
Performing artists, self-employed like freelance journalists, are not protected by public 
programs designed for employees. Yet their associations’ efforts have earned them special 
consideration from the authorities. Dancers, for example, are protected by the Act Respecting 
Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, even during periods of supervised training. A 
public program was set up to facilitate career transitions by this particular group who, due to the 
physical demands of their art, cannot expect to last in their profession beyond the age of 40. 
Finally, in recent years, the state has invested in continuing education programs for performing 
artists, on top of merit-based grants and subsidies.  
To protect themselves against the risk of underemployment, artists adopt individual 
strategies similar to those of freelance journalists: recurrent contracts with the same clients and 
diversification. As Menger (1997) has clearly shown, artists branch out into different niches, one 
after the other or concurrently: acting, writing, sometimes directing. Some work in one or more 
artistic areas along with non-artistic jobs, sometimes teaching, sometimes little jobs simply to get 
by. Although diversification may ensure survival, it also entails the risk of distancing artists from 
their networks, and thus speeding up the spiral of underemployment. Diversification, even 
moving into a new profession, is also seen as a solution to the problem of aging, in these fields 
where subtle agism persists.  
But what distinguishes performing artists from the other two groups being studied is the 
existence of a special collective labour relations scheme that requires producers to negotiate 
group agreements with recognized artists’ associations. Under these agreements, clients pay a 
percentage of every fee into group social security plans (illness, pension) managed by the artists’ 
associations. Yet, to be eligible for benefits, artists must have earned a certain minimum amount 
21 
from a single occupation, and there are no bridges between the different plans. What’s more, 
only the work performed in sectors covered by law entitles members to protection, which 
excludes non-artistic jobs taken to make ends meet.  
As a result of chronic underemployment and poor pay in the performing arts, the amount 
of income replacement under the plans is low for most artists. Those who have been through 
well-paid periods have been able to accumulate financial resources to help them deal with illness 
and retirement, either in the plans or on the private market. But as a rule, most have the same 
resources to handle risk as freelance journalists: generally low savings, perhaps a house, spouse 
and family. Finally, it is also largely up to artists themselves to remain employable, especially 
through unseen, yet nevertheless essential work, such as practising every day for musicians or 
learning lines for actors, which is unpaid and uncounted for the purposes of calculating social 
benefits. 
6. Analysis and discussion 
In this section, we will attempt to explain the differences between the three groups of 
workers by analysing them in light of two series of factors: the power of professionals versus 
clients, and the institutions that regulate some job markets. 
6.1 Power of professionals versus clients 
Video game designers work in a seller’s market; the demand for labour is very high, 
headhunters are constantly soliciting employees and it is very easy to change jobs. As a result, 
the individual’s bargaining power, and thus average pay, are high (Legault and Ouellet 2012), 
unlike in other industries, such as journalism, where clients set the rates. Yet investors have 
demonstrated many times over the great tendency of capital to move to countries where labour is 
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cheaper ( Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009).  Despite the fact that North America is a vaunted 
hothouse for creative talent, this latent threat reduces bargaining power and dampens the 
demands of designers along with any hints of collective action to counter the problems of 
unlimited unpaid overtime (which transfers inherent business risk to designers, besides being 
illegal under the Act Respecting Labour Standards), non-disclosure agreements that limit 
designers’ mobility and intellectual property disputes that hamper the development of a 
reputation.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the risk of underemployment is ever present among 
performing artists, in markets where the labour supply exceeds demand. The great job insecurity 
of artists can largely be explained by the unequal power relationship typical of the industry: it is 
clearly to the advantage of a small number of clients, who can choose to do business with 
whomever they like on their own terms. As some respondents said, they don’t often have the 
choice of refusing offers of work, even if they are overqualified and even if they are paid at the 
minimum rate of their group agreements. Collective bargaining has certainly helped establish 
minimum working conditions and compensation but, except for a minority of stars, artists are 
paid at the minimum rate under their group agreements. That explains why the average pay of 
performing artists is much lower than that of video game designers. For example, in 2005, 
actors’ mean employment income was $25,063 ($19,992 for actresses); for male musicians and 
singers $16,899 ($11,700 for female musicians and singers) and $22,767 for male dancers 
($10,824 for female dancers) (OCCQ 2010). There are also major inequalities between 
subindustries and between individuals.  
Freelance journalists have a great deal in common with artists. Specialized expertise is no 
longer such a prized asset, as journalism is tending to become just another industry: content is 
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produced without any particular expertise and recycled on several platforms, thus devaluing its 
producers. Aside from a few big names, freelance journalists have very little individual 
bargaining power with respect to pay or even the obligation to sign over their copyright. In this 
world, attempts to establish a collective labour relations scheme have failed and only a minority 
of freelancers have individual bargaining power, which may explain why, according to various 
surveys, rates have not increased in 10 years and are much closer to those of performing artists 
than of video game designers. 
6.2 Role of institutions 
While the international literature on project work and the arts industry tells us that 
performance risk and employment risk are everywhere assumed in whole or in part by workers, 
the relative protection against economic and social risks depends on the institutional setting: the 
welfare regime, the legal framework for performance (employment contracts in the case of 
employees and contracts for services or contracts of service in the case of the self-employed) and 
finally collective bargaining. We will briefly review the role of these three types of institutions. 
As already mentioned, the Quebec institutional framework falls within the liberal 
category in Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states, with some important particularities. 
Some social protection schemes are universal (health insurance and minimum old age security 
benefits) while others (parental leave and contributory pension plans) also apply to self-
employed workers, albeit at a high cost and often with lower levels of benefits, reflecting the low 
incomes of many of them. This explains why employees and self-employed workers in Quebec 
are better protected than their American counterparts, though not as well as their European 
colleagues.  
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Within this national institutional framework, employment status, or the fact that the work 
is governed by an employment contract rather than a business contract, is of strategic 
importance: employee status entitles workers to the protection of labour legislation (minimum 
employment standards and the right to unionize) and to employers’ contribution to the protection 
against social risks.  
In Quebec, tax credits for wages in the game industry may help support the paid 
employment that could confer protection on designers thus covered by universal labour laws and 
risk-pooling plans. But the state that generously supports the industry is sending a mixed 
message with regard to its own legal framework for overtime, which employers do not respect 
(Pereira 2009, 4). Long working hours affect workers’ health, family life, productivity (due to 
mistakes caused by fatigue), income and equity (Burke and Fiskenbaum 2009; Campbell 2002). 
While in many European countries, including France and Belgium, freelance journalists 
and the vast majority of performing artists are counted as employees, in Canada/Quebec like in 
the US they are considered to be self-employed workers. They alone assume the risk of 
employment, and sometimes inherent business risk as well, writing proposals with no guarantee 
of payment. With few exceptions, their clients contribute nothing to their protection in case of 
illness or injury or for retirement, either. Partly excluded from arrangements for pooling 
occupational and social risks, they must rely on their own or their family’s resources to steer 
clear, or deal with, any situation that might affect their ability to work, whether temporarily or 
permanently. Contrary to what Kalleberg (2003) states, the lack of protection is not the same for 
all forms of atypical jobs, except perhaps in the United States, where employee status affords 
very little protection. 
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Performing artists benefit from a legal framework requiring that public and private 
producers negotiate group agreements with recognized artists’ associations, an exception among 
the self-employed in Quebec, and among the cultural sector in North America. Negotiated group 
agreements provide for client contributions to social protection in case of illness and for 
retirement but the degree of protection depends on income level and repeat work in a sector 
covered by the law, with no chance of accumulating hours worked in various other occupations 
for the purposes of the protection. That explains why, for most artists, these plans provide no 
more than a fairly low level of income replacement. Collective bargaining has led to the 
recognition of new stakeholders (performing artists’ associations), which, beyond their role of 
bargaining agent, advocate for legislative changes. This explains why performing artists have 
managed to obtain (partial) protection from public sources to cope with the risk of occupational 
injury and obsolescence of knowledge, unlike freelance journalists who, although having 
unsuccessfully struggled for years to gain a similar framework, are generally left entirely to their 
own devices.  
Although institutions do provide, to varying degrees, some forms of limited risk 
protection, it is still very inadequate, and it is taken for granted that workers will be able to afford 
to buy their own protection. But access to and the degree of such protection are related to 
earnings: professionals with strong market power and low risk of underemployment can often 
afford it. But for many professionals, as for workers who do not have the same skill levels or 
capital, to paraphrase Castel (2003), protection will be collective or non-existent. This 
observation is significant because the political responses to problems raised by the risk society 
will depend on the way those problems are defined: Should they be attributed to a lack of 
individual resources or an institutional failing? 
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Conclusion 
The video game designers, self-employed journalists and performing artists in our 
research projects have a great deal in common. First of all, they are highly educated, very often 
having an undergraduate degree, and develop unique items as part of fixed-length projects that 
call for specialized skills, placing them squarely in the knowledge economy. Furthermore, 
having no guarantee of further work, they must assume a good part of the uncertainty inherent in 
the market and their personal lives (health, family) and absolutely must keep up their 
employability and networking in order to maintain their positions on the market.  
Without denying the importance of tradable skills and the human and social capital that 
enable individuals to pursue mobility, we wanted to further study the diversity of situations 
coexisting among knowledge workers. Our results reveal that the lot of these professionals is far 
from being uniformly attractive and that high qualifications are not a universal protective factor 
in the risk society. They suggest, rather, that the political economy of the various markets in 
which knowledge workers offer their services, as well as the institutions that structure these 
markets—or do not—is at least as important in determining the fate that awaits them when they 
are old or sick, and that these other factors help create, among these highly skilled workers, a 
variety of risk societies.  
Among the professionals we have studied, the best paid and protected in case of inability 
to work are video game designers, when they enjoy employee benefits and significant individual 
market power. Yet if the industry’s economic situation were to change and that power were 
eroded, those employees would be heavily disadvantaged without a collective bargaining scheme 
like that of performing artists. But the mobility of venture capital has kept them from 
undertaking such an initiative so far. No matter how prosperous this booming industry, which 
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has now outstripped the movie industry, inherent business risk is transferred to designers by 
means of a two-tier compensation system with royalties that is in contradiction to their status as 
employees because part of their work (overtime) may be unpaid.  
Except for a small number of stars, self-employed performing artists have no individual 
market power, but do receive a minimum of protection through collective bargaining on those 
minimum standards. Finally, freelance journalists have nothing but their own individual market 
power, which is weak in most cases. 
In all three cases, the stars stand out by escaping the worst conditions of the transfer of 
performance and employment risk, while most others must assume it. Consistent with the results 
of earlier studies (Benner 2002; Barley and Kunda 2004; D’Amours 2009), professionals 
(whether self-employed or atypical employees) who are not in a favourable market position, and 
even some of those who are, have no more protection against risks than non-professionals and 
non-unionized workers. Diversification into several fields or subfields, holding several jobs, 
meticulously maintaining ability to work, employability and networks are the ultimate resources 
for coping with periods of underemployment as well as aging. We consider that these 
conclusions have a potential of generalisation; they could apply to other sectors of employment 
in the knowledge economy: finance, business consultancy, higher education, cultural industries, 
special events organization, and so forth, that share some determinant characteristics with the 
sectors we have studied. This requires to study these fields more painstakely (examining in 
particular if those workers are considered as employees and have an access to collective 
bargaining, which is the case for contingent faculty members in  Quebec) and aims at developing 
a model of coping with risk among contingent highly skilled workers.  
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While the institutions protect against risk, they are not enough. It is essential to note that 
the institutions that regulate some atypical job markets today, like employment relationship and 
collective bargaining, do not have the protective effect of those that wound up decommodifying 
most workers in the postwar period. When applying to contingent workers, protective institutions 
cover only the limited duration of the employment relationship. Both the definition of employee 
status and the collective bargaining schemes are ill suited to the mobility of these workers and 
the short terms of their job performances. Thus, video game designers benefit from social 
programs when they are employees, but many in the industry are small independent contractors. 
Furthermore, many employed designers are heavily disadvantaged by their international mobility 
because all risk-pooling plans are national. On the other hand, the benefits allowed to performing 
artists under group agreements within the national framework show obvious limits: they are tied 
to income level, which is itself tied to frequency of performances in a profession protected by its 
own group agreement, transferable within the same occupation, but not outside; moreover, 
though compensated during a sick or maternity leave, a contingent worker still jeopardizes 
his/her reputation by not being fully available to work and as a consequence, challenges his/her 
chances of re-employment as well.  
There is therefore a need to strengthen these institutions, as well as universal standards 
and programs, if we wish to remedy the citizenship deficit that characterizes these workers 
(Legault and D’Amours 2011). They must also be adapted to take into account knowledge 
workers’ growing mobility, both national and international, and the new needs for portable rights 
with respect to citizenship at work.  
Finally, we saw that the strategies of skilled workers to protect themselves against the 
risks are mostly individual: diversification into several fields or subfields, meticulously 
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maintaining ability to work, employability and networks, adopting a healthy lifestyle. But what 
about collective action? In previous work (Legault and D’Amours 2011; D’Amours 2006), we 
have documented struggles of performing artists to gain a special collective labour relations 
scheme and (partial) public protection to cope with the risk of occupational injury and 
obsolescence of knowledge; fights of freelance journalists to get similar benefits and recognition 
of their copyright (lawsuits against major editors, following the example of the New York times 
freelancers) and the use of social web by video game designers to protest against the unlimited 
free overtime, resulting in filing three class actions. 
But their collective action does not lead to formal or classical union action for at least two 
reasons. On the one hand, the Quebec legal framework still makes industry-based certification an 
exception to the North American dominant enterprise-based mode, reserved for performing 
artists, building trades and a few other ones. In the case of video game designers, even if they 
claimed their own model of industry-based certification, their international mobility would 
considerably limit their interest in negotiating benefits restricted to the national territory (Legault 
and Weststar 201*). On the other hand, these highly skilled workers put forward deeply distinct 
aspirations from those of the classical unionized membership. They do not want a universal and 
equal remuneration system based on seniority, education and skills, if it excludes any reference 
to the prestige and reputation. Unlike typical industrial citizen, performing artists, video game 
designers and freelance journalists are claiming a share of the added value generated by their 
intellectual contribution, in proportion to their market value. They are claiming to enhance their 
condition while keeping a multi-layered compensation system, some components being universal 
and minimal, other ones variable and meritocratic. This system is generating uneven benefits and 
claimed as such. Certainly, they have nothing to do with seniority, key principle of industrial 
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trade unionism in North America (Legault and D’Amours 2011). 
Endnote 
1. In fact, under the Copyright Act, a freelancer or self-employed worker sells only the first 
publication right and may negotiate additional payment for subsequent publications. 
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